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Abstract
In Part I, the author will clarify the facts regarding the evolution of the incidents and the adop-
tion of the resultant resolutions. In Part II, the author will analyze the legal questions regarding the
two resolutions. Part II will first examine the legality of the missile launch on the basis of Security
Council Resolution 1540, customary international law and the Chicago Convention on Interna-
tional Civil Aviation. Second, Part II will examine Resolution 1695’s terminology by comparing
it to previous resolutions. Third, it will discuss the sanctions based on national legal authorities
and legislations. Fourth, Part II will examine international law regarding nuclear weapons con-
trol. Part III investigates the legally binding force of the two resolutions. Resolution 1695 does
not refer to Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter (the “Charter”) in its main text, indicating
that the Security Council may not take any collective security measures toward North Korea. The
legally binding force of the resolution has been controversial since its drafting. That question will
be discussed here. Resolution 1718 authorized the Security Council to enact non-military sanc-
tions under Article 41 of the Charter. Resolution 1718 also prevents U.N. Member States from
providing any arms or technology related to ballistic missiles or WMD. Furthermore, the United
States demanded that U.N. Member States take part in cargo inspection to and from North Korea.
The final section will be devoted to analyzing the cargo inspection with respect to the law of the
sea.
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INTRODUCTION
2006 will be remembered as a watershed year for North Ko-
rea's ("DPRK") weapons of mass destruction ("WMD") develop-
ment process.' Kim Jong II's regime conducted missile and nu-
clear weapons tests in the latter half of that year.2 The missile
test came first.3 On July 5, 2006, in the early morning and late
afternoon, North Korea fired a total of seven missiles toward the
East Sea of Korea, including Rodong (labor), Scud and inter-
continental ballistic missiles ("ICBM") from missile bases located
in Musudan-ri, Hwadae-gun, North Hamgyong Province and Git-
daeryeong, Anbyeon-gun, Kangwon-do Province.4 Most of the
missiles crashed into the northern part of the East Sea.5 The
ICBM that received the most attention, Taepodong 2, flew on
course for less than a minute before crashing into the East Sea.6
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1. See generally Chronology of North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Development, USA
TODAY, Oct. 9, 2006, http://usatoday.com/news/world/2006-10-09-nkorea-timelinex.
htn [hereinafter Chronology].
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id.; see also Helen Cooper & Warren Hoge, US. Seeks Strong Measures to Warn
the North Koreans, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2006, at 10; Myoung-Gun Lee & Dong-Yong Min,
Slow Response to ICBM Test Criticized, DONGA.coM, July 6, 2006, http://english.donga.
com/srv/service.php3?biid=2006070699308.
5. See Lee & Min, supra note 4.
6. See Lawmakers Chide Roh Administration Over Missile Launch, KOREA HERALD, July
7, 2006.
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FIGURE -1: THE MISSILES LAUNCHED BY NORTH KOREA
Source: Korea Broadcasting Service
Next came the nuclear arms test on October 9, 2006.8
North Korea claimed it conducted a successful nuclear test in
Hwade-ri near Kilju city.9 On October 16, 2006, the U.S. Office
of Nuclear Intelligence announced that "[a]nalysis of air sam-
ples collected October 11, 2006, detected radioactive debris
which confirms that North Korea conducted an underground
nuclear explosion."'" According to the statement, the explosion
yield was less than one kiloton.1' Seismic signals around the
world ranged from a magnitude of 3.5 to 4.2 on the Richter
scale, but it is difficult to translate those measurements to explo-
sion yield due to a lack of information on the exact geology of
the site. 12
7. KBS World, Concerns Over the NK's Development of Missiles, http://world.kbs.
co.kr/english/event/nkorea nuclear/news_04c.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2007).
8. See Chronology, supra note 1.
9. See Anthony Faiola, Glenn Kessler & Dafna Linzer, North Korea Announces Nuclear
Test, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 9, 2006, at Al.
10. See SIEGFRIED S. HECKER, CTR. FOR INT'L SEC. AND COOPERATION, REPORT ON
NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM 4 (2006), available at http://cisac.stanford.edu/
publications/report on northkorean-nuclearprogram.
11. See id.
12. See id.
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North Korean experts were reluctant to discuss the exact
facts of the nuclear test. The director of the Yongbyon Nuclear
Scientific Research Center, North Korea's major nuclear facility,
merely confirmed that his facility produced the plutonium metal
for the test device, offering no other information.'" Diplomatic
and military officials of North Korea, however, declared that the
nuclear test was "powerful and fully successful."14
North Korea's missile launches and nuclear test had a
profound impact on the global community. First, the missile
launches broke the moratorium on missile launching between
the United States and North Korea that the two nations had fol-
lowed for several years.' 5 Second, the nuclear test was not in
accordance with the basic principles of the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ("NPT")16 and other interna-
tional treaties banning nuclear weapons tests. 7 The United
States and Japan strongly criticized North Korea's missile and
nuclear tests as threatening global peace.18 Japanese Chief Cabi-
net Secretary Shinzo Abe hinted that Japan could assert legiti-
mate self-defense rights to attack North Korea's missile bases
preemptively under certain situations."9 The United States and
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. The moratorium was initiated in September 1999 after North Korea launched
the Taepodong 1 missile in 1998 and it was reconfirmed in October 2000 by a joint
communiquL While North Korea had verbally repudiated the moratorium in June,
2006, it came to an end on July 5, 2006, when North Korea launched the Taepodong 2.
See Hwang Jae-hoon, North Korea Abolished the Moratorium Completely in Seven Years,
YONHAP NEWS (S. Korea), July 10, 2006, http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/cgi-bin/naver
(available only in Korean); see also Helene Cooper & Michael R. Gordon, N. Korea Dis-
avows Moratorium on Missile Testing, INT'L HERALD TmiB., June 21, 2006.
16. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T.
483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter NPT] ("Recalling the determination expressed by
the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in
outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all
test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this
end, ...").
17. International treaties prohibiting nuclear weapons tests include the Partial
Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974, The Peaceful Nuclear
Explosion Treaty of 1976, and The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty of 1996. See generally
HARAIAMBOS ATHANASOPULOS, NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 33-51
(2000).
18. See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Condemns Democratic
People's Republic of Korea's Missile Launches, Unanimously Adopting Resolution
1695, U.N. Doc. SC/8778 (July 15, 2006) [hereinafter Security Council Condemns].
19. See Editorial, Japan's Reassertion, KoREA HERALD, July 13, 2006; Shin Ji-hong,
North Korea Missile -Japan's Plan for Advanced Attack Toward Opponent, YONHAP NEWS (S.
20071
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Japan agreed that bold action should be taken against North Ko-
rea at the United Nations ("U.N."). South Korea, also expres-
sing deep regret toward North Korea's missile and nuclear tests,
took the decisive position that North Korea must come back to
the Six-Party Talks.20 North Korea, however, countered that the
missile launches and nuclear test were normal military exercises
intended to strengthen the nation's defense. 2' These missile
and nuclear disputes were finally referred to the U.N. Security
Council (the "Council") for a diplomatic resolution, resulting in
the Council passing two resolutions.22
This Article deals with the critical issues concerning the
two Security Council resolutions (1695 and 1718) condemning
North Korea's missile and nuclear weapons testing from a view-
point of international law. The main focus will be the legally
binding force of the resolutions against North Korea. This Arti-
cle is composed of three parts. In Part I, the author will clarify
the facts regarding the evolution of the incidents and the adop-
tion of the resultant resolutions. In Part II, the author will ana-
lyze the legal questions regarding the two resolutions. Part II
will first examine the legality of the missile launch on the basis of
Security Council Resolution 1540, customary international law
and the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation.
Second, Part II will examine Resolution 1695's terminology by
comparing it to previous resolutions. Third, it will discuss the
sanctions based on national legal authorities and legislations.
Fourth, Part II will examine international law regarding nuclear
weapons control. Part III investigates the legally binding force
of the two resolutions. Resolution 1695 does not refer to Chap-
ter VII of the United Nations Charter (the "Charter")23 in its
main text, indicating that the Security Council may not take any
collective security measures toward North Korea. The legally
binding force of the resolution has been controversial since its
Korea), July 10, 2006, http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/cgi-bin/naver (available only in
Korean).
20. See Warren Hoge & Choe Sang-Hun, North Korea Rejects UN Missile Demand,
INT'L HERALD TmRB., July 16, 2006, at 1.
21. See HwangJae-hoon, Military Vanguard Protects South Korea: North Korea's Absurd
Claim, YONHAP NEWS (S. Korea), July 15, 2006, http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/cgi-bin/
naver (available only in Korean).
22. See S.C. Res. 1718, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1718 (Oct. 14, 2006); S.C. Res. 1695, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1695 (July 15, 2006).
23. U.N. Charter arts. 39-51.
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drafting. That question will be discussed here. Resolution 1718
authorized the Security Council to enact non-military sanctions
under Article 41 of the Charter. Resolution 1718 also prevents
U.N. Member States from providing any arms or technology re-
lated to ballistic missiles or WMD. Furthermore, the United
States demanded that U.N. Member States take part in cargo in-
spection to and from North Korea. The final section will be de-
voted to analyzing the cargo inspection with respect to the law of
the sea.
I. ADOPTION OF THE TWO SECURITY
COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS
1. Resolution 1695
Right after North Korea launched the missiles on July 5,
2006, the United States and Japan addressed the U.N. Security
Council. 24 The next day, Japan completed a draft resolution and
started diplomatic negotiations with members of the Security
Council, soliciting support for its resolution. 2' The draft resolu-
tion presented by Japan included sanctions on any funds, com-
modities, goods and technologies that could be used for the de-
velopment of WMD in North Korea. 26 In addition, Japan re-
quested that North Korea instantly stop the development,
experimentation and proliferation of nuclear weapons.2 7 John
Bolton, the United States' permanent representative to the
United Nations, reportedly contacted other permanent mem-
bers of the Security Council and informally discussed North Ko-
rea's missile tests. 28 On the other hand, China submitted a draft
of a Presidential Statement on July 11 that both emphasized the
importance of a diplomatic settlement of North Korea's missile
test and demanded that North Korea abide by the moratorium
on missile launching.
29
24. See Dana Priest & Anthony Faiola, North Korea Tests Long-Range Missile, WASH.
POST, July 5, 2006, at Al.
25. See Security Council Condemns, supra note 18.
26. See id.; see also Betsy Pisik, U.S., Japan Lead Push to Sanction Pyongyang, WASH.
TIMzs, Oct. 10, 2006, at Al.
27. See Security Council Condemns, supra note 18.
28. See, e.g., U.N. Ambassador Bolton Holds a Media Availability Following a Security
Council Meeting on North Korea, WASH. POST, July 5, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/5/AR2006070500793.html (transcript from
media availability after Security Council meeting on North Korea).
29. See Kim Gye-hwan, The Prospects of China's Draft of UN Security Council Resolution,
2007]
6 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL
FIGURE I-1 TIMELINE OF ADOPTING RESOLUTION 1695
Date (2006) Evolution of the Process
July 5 North Korea test-fired missiles-Japan called for U.N. Security
Council meeting
July 6 Japan completed the draft of a resolution calling for sanctions
against North Korea
July 7-13 Assistant Undersecretary of the United States, Christopher Hill,
visited Seoul, Tokyo and Beijing
July 10 Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, announced the possibility
of attacking North Korea preemptively-Japan delayed the
Security Council resolution
July 11 South Korea criticized Japan's aggressive position
July 12 China and Russia propose a new draft of the Security Council
resolution against North Korea
July 15 After extensive debate and bargaining, the Security Council
passed Resolution 1695
The Security Council called for experts to discuss the ques-
tion of North Korea's missile tests.30 Since the positions of the
United States and Japan clashed with those of China and Russia,
however, the Council had difficulties coming to a unanimous
agreement. On July 12, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov
pointed out that the Security Council's sanctions could obstruct
the actual solution to the problem.3 He urged Japan to change
its standpoint toward North Korea.3 2 Although the Council was
trying to adopt the final draft resolution, it was delayed because
China and Russia were expected to veto the resolution drafted
by Japan. 3 As a compromise, France and Britain proposed a
two-step approach which was composed of adopting a Presiden-
tial Statement criticizing North Korea, and then passing a resolu-
tion with sanctions.34 On July 12, China and Russia proposed a
YONHAP NEWS (S. Korea), July 11, 2006, http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/cgi-bin/naver
(available only in Korean).
30. See North Korea Calls Missile Launches Successful, Threatens More, WHITE HoUSE
BULL., July 6, 2006.
31. See Japan's Stand on North Korea "Unacceptable" Russian Foreign Minister Says, BBC
WORLDWIDE MONITORING, July 12, 2006; U.S. Envoy Says NK Unlikely to Return to 6-Party
Talks, KOREA HERALD, July 13, 2006 [hereinafter U.S. Envoy], available at http://www.
koreaherald.co.kr/archives/resultcontents.asp?id=20060713004&query=lavrov.
32. See US. Envoy, supra note 31.
33. See Lee Dong-min, China, Russia Introduce Alternative NK Resolution, YON4AP
NEWS (S. Korea), July 13, 2006.
34. See Shin Ji-hong, Britain and France Suggest A Resolution with Chapter Seven Omit-
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new draft resolution demanding that North Korea return to the
Six-Party Talks.35 The amended draft of China and Russia
strongly criticized North Korea's missile tests and urged it to re-
declare the moratorium on missile launching. 6 It also asked for
other U.N. Member States to stop providing resources and tech-
nology that could be used in missile development.3 7 France and
Britain comprehensively revised the China-Russia draft, combin-
ing it with that of the United States and Japan.3" In the end, on
July 15, the Council unanimously passed Resolution 1695, which
demanded that North Korea discontinue missile discharge. The
main points of Resolution 1695 are outlined below: 9
The Security Council,
Reaffirming its resolutions 825 (1993) of 11 May 1993 and
1540 (2004) of 28 April 2004....
- Condemns the multiple launches by the DPRK of ballistic
missiles on 5 July 2006 local time;4
- Demands that the DPRK suspend all activities related to its
ballistic missile programme ... ;41
- Requires all Member States .... to exercise vigilance and
prevent missile and missile-related items, materials, goods
and technology being transferred to DPRK's missile or
WMD programmes; ... 42
- Underlines... the need to show restraint and refrain from
any action that might aggravate tension ... ;43
- Strongly Urges the DPRK to return immediately to the Six-
Party Talks... and to return at an early date to the Treaty
on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. ... "
ted-China, Japan, and United States of America Consider Adopting the Suggested Resolution,
YONHAP NEWS (S. Korea), July 15, 2006, http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/cgi-bin/naver
(available only in Korean).
35. See Lee, supra note 33.
36. See Warren Hoge, U.S. Hits Obstacle to Action by U.N. on North Korea, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 14, 2006, at Al; Warren Hoge & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Bush Rebukes North Korea, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 10, 2006, at Al [hereinafter Bush Rebukes North Korea].
37. See Lee, supra note 33.
38. See U.N. Agrees on Resolution Against North Korea, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2006; see
also Yoshikazu Shirakawa & Takaharu Yoshiyama, France, UK. Key Deal Brokers, DALY
YoMiuRo (Tokyo), July 17, 2006, at 3.
39. S.C. Res. 1695, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1695 Uuly 15, 2006).
40. Id. 1.
41. Id. 2.
42. Id. 3.
43. Id. 5.
44. Id. 6.
2007]
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North Korea immediately rejected Resolution 1695. Park
Gil-yeon, North Korea's permanent representative to the United
Nations, criticized the Security Council's decision, stating that
his country "resolutely condemns the attempt of some countries
to misuse the Security Council for the despicable political aim to
isolate and put pressure on the [DPRK] and totally rejects the
resolution '4 5 Park also added, "[t]he situation is clear enough
to show that there is no need for North Korea to discontinue the
missile discharge and North Korea's missile launches not only
preserve peace and stability in Northeast Asia, but counterpoise
the power balance among countries as well."46
2. Resolution 1718
Following the missile test-firing, North Korea created even
more controversy in the global community with its nuclear weap-
ons test of October 9, 2006, which alarmed the world. It imme-
diately became the most serious problem that the members of
the Security Council needed to address.4 7 The United States
and Japan agreed that the Security Council should take effective
action in concert with the countries of the Six-Party Talks.4" The
United States drafted a resolution calling for both international
inspections of all cargo moving into and out of North Korea to
detect weapons-related materials, and a freeze on any transfer or
development of WMD.4" The United States' proposals high-
lighted the Proliferation Security Initiative ("PSI")51 which aims
45. See Hoge, supra note 20.
46. See Lee Rae-woon & Kim Gye-hwan, LN Security Council Adopts Final Resolution
Toward North Korea, YONHAP NEWS (S. Korea), July 15, 2006, http://www.yonhapnews.
co.kr/cgi-bin/naver (available only in Korean).
47. See e.g., Annan Presses for U.S. Talks with N Korea, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2006, at
A22; Press Release, General Assembly, Reduction of Nuclear Arsenals Verification, Clus-
ter Munitions, Among Issues Raised, As First Committee Continues Debate, U.N. Doc.
GA/DIS/3328 (Oct. 16, 2006).
48. See Jin Dae-woong, Bush, Abe Urge Bold U.N. Action, KOREA HERALD, Oct. 10,
2006.
49. See U.N. Considers Tough Sanctions, KOREA HERALD, Oct. 11, 2006.
50. The Proliferation Security Initiative ("PSI") (inaugurated in June 2003) is an
international effort led by the United States to prevent the proliferation of nuclear,
chemical and biological weapons and materials. The Initiative is designed to work
within the framework of other international agreements. The PSI consists of 15 core
countries including the United States of America, Britain, Australia, Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Japan, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, and Rus-
sia. A further 60 countries have agreed to cooperate on an ad hoc basis. For more
details, see John R. Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Secur-
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to encourage member countries to interdict weapons from
North Korea, Iran and other states of concern. 51 Japan pro-
posed even more stringent measures; these included banning all
North Korean ships and planes from all ports if they are sus-
pected of carrying nuclear or ballistic missile-related materials.52
Japan also insisted that the new resolution contain Chapter VII
of the Charter, authorizing the Security Council to take military
measures against threats to international peace and security.
South Korea underscored the need to take calm, strategic and
well-coordinated actions based on discussion and cooperation
among the allies in accordance with the Charter.54 China and
Russia took a cautious approach to the subject of military action.
China warned North Korea that its nuclear test would harm
friendly relations among neighboring countries and called on
the United Nations to take appropriate measures to push North
Korea to abandon its nuclear program.55 Chinese Foreign Min-
istry Spokesman, Liu Jianchao, emphasized the importance of
diplomatic efforts, asserting that it was not the right time for
punishment, much less military action.56 Also stressing the need
for a diplomatic solution, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey
Lavrov said Russia was prepared "to participate in joint efforts by
interested parties with the aim of a peaceful, diplomatic settle-
ment of the situation."57
On the other hand, the United States insisted that the reso-
lution be drawn up under Chapter VII of the Charter, which au-
thorizes punishments including breaking diplomatic ties, impos-
ing economic sanctions, naval blockades and military action. 8
China opposed the inclusion of a general reference to Chapter
ity Affairs, Proliferation Security Initiative: Statement of Interdiction Principles, Re-
marks at Proliferation Security Initiative Meeting, (Sept. 4, 2003) available at http://
www.state.gov/t/us/rm/23801 .htm.
51. See generally id.; Michael A. Fletcher, Bush Fails to Persuade S. Korea on Sanctions,
IASH. POST, Nov. 19, 2006, at A24; U.N. Considers Tough Sanctions, supra note 49.
52. See U.N. Considers Tough Sanctions, supra note 49.
53. See China Gets Tough on N. Korea, KOREA HERALD, Oct. 12, 2006; see also U.N.
Charter arts. 39-51.
54. SeeJin, supra note 48.
55. See id.; Colum Lynch & Maureen Fan, China Says It Will Back Sanctions on N.
Korea, WASH. POST, Oct. 11, 2006, at Al.
56. SeeJin, supra note 48.
57. See id.
58. See Bush Rebukes North Korea, supra note 36; U.S. to Impose Nonmilitary NK. Sanc-
tions, KOREA HERALD, Oct. 14, 2006; see also U.N. Charter arts. 39-51.
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VII, preferring that retaliatory measures be limited to those au-
thorized by Article 41, which allows only non-military sanc-
tions.59 Following harsh debates within the Security Council, the
two sides adopted a new draft resolution, which stated that the
Council would only take measures provided by Article 41 in act-
ing under Chapter VII of the Charter.60
TABLE 1-2: PROCESS OF ADOPTING RESOLUTION 1718
Date (2006) Evolution of the Process
October 9 North Korea conducted nuclear test
October 10 Japan said response could include military measures
October 13 South Korea's President, Rho Moo-hyun, and Chinese
Communist Party General Secretary, Hu Jintao, agreed to
resolve the question of North Korea's nuclear test
diplomatically
October 14 The Security Council passed Resolution 1718
October 16 US Office of Nuclear Intelligence issued the statement on the
analysis of air samples
On October 14, 2006, the Security Council unanimously
passed the draft as Resolution 1718.61 The resolution, acknowl-
edging North Korea's nuclear test as a clear threat to interna-
tional peace and security, imposed certain sanctions on North
Korea.6 2 Specifically, Resolution 1718 calls on all U.N. Member
States to inspect cargo vessels leaving or arriving in North Korea
in order to prevent any illegal trafficking in unconventional
weapons or ballistic missiles.6 Park Gil-yon of North Korea con-
tinued to blame the United States, saying its "threats, sanctions
and pressure" forced North Korea to "prove its possession of
nukes to protect its sovereignty and right to existence from the
daily increasing danger of war from the United States."6 4
The main points of Resolution 1718 are outlined below:
59. See U.S. to Impose Nonmilitary N.K. Sanctions, supra note 58; see also U.N. Charter
art. 41.
60. See U.S. to Impose Nonmilitary NK. Sanctions, supra note 58.
61. S.C. Res. 1718, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1718 (October 14, 2006).
62. See id.
63. See U.N. Imposes Sanctions on NK., KOREA HERALD, Oct. 16 2007.
64. See id. For more details on North Korea's reaction, see Press Release, Statement
of the Foreign Ministry of North Korea in Response to UN Security Council Resolution
1718 (Oct. 17, 2006), available at http://se2.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?service
ID=PRIA&fileid=BAAE5799-9CFS-D6A3-3F27-D605A21418D7&lng=en.
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The Security Council, ...
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Na-
tions, and taking measures under its Article 41,65
- Condemns the nuclear test proclaimed by the DPRK on 9
October 2006 ... ;66
- Demands that the DPRK not conduct any further nuclear
test or launch of a ballistic missile;
67
- Demands that the DPRK immediately retract its announce-
ment of withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Prolifera-
tion of Nuclear Weapons;
68
- Demands further that the DPRK return to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards ... ; 69
- Decides also that the DPRK shall abandon all other existing
weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile pro-
gramme in a complete, verifiable and irreversible man-
ner;
70
- Decides that:
(a) all Member States shall prevent the direct or indirect
supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK ... of;
(i) any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large cal-
ibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters,
warships, missiles or missile systems.... ;71
(ii) all items, materials, equipment, goods and technol-
ogy as set out in the lists in documents S/2006/814 and
S/2006/815... ;72
(d) All Member States shall . . . freeze immediately the
funds, other financial assets and economic resources... ;73
(f) ... all Member States are called upon to take... coop-
erative action including through inspection of cargo to
and from the DPRK, as necessary;
7 4
- Calls upon the DPRK to return immediately to the Six-Party
Talks without precondition and to work towards the ex-
65. S.C. Res. 1718, supra note 61, pmbl.
66. Id. 1.
67. Id. 1 2.
68. Id. 1 3.
69. Id. 4.
70. Id. 1 7.
71. Id. 8(a)(i).
72. Id. 8(a)(ii). These other items are those that could contribute to North
Korea's nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-
related programs. Id.
73. Id. I 8(d).
74. Id. 8(f).
2007]
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peditious implementation of the Joint Statement issued
on 19 September 2005 by China, the DPRK, Japan, the Re-
public of Korea, the Russian Federation and the United
States. 7
5
II. LEGAL QUESTIONS OF THE TWO SECURITY
COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS
A. Is a Missile Launch of a Sovereign State in
Violation of International Law?
1. Resolution 1540
The legality of a missile launch was first addressed by the
Security Council's Resolution 1540 of April 28, 2004, which was
referred to at the beginning of Resolution 1695. Resolution
1540 states that the proliferation of WMD, "as well as their means
of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and secur-
ity."' 76 By this resolution, the international community recog-
nized that the launch of a missile was in violation of interna-
tional law. Before Resolution 1540, missile development or fir-
ing was not a question of international law because it was
regarded as a matter of a country's right to self-defense. Even at
the time of North Korea's Taepodong 1 missile discharge in
1998, in spite of the international community's strong desire for
sanctions against North Korea, the Security Council could do no
more than release a Presidential Statement. At that time there
was not a clear international legal ground outlawing missile test-
launches. International treaties concerning WMD, such as the
NPT,77 the Chemical Weapons Convention ("CWC"),78 and the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention ("BTWC") 7 , do not
75. Id. 14.
76. S.C. Res. 1540, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1540 (April 14, 2004) (emphasis ad-
ded).
77. See NPT, supra note 16.
78. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling
and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, G.A. Res. 47/39, U.N. GAOR,
47th Sess., 74th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/39, 32 I.L.M. 800 (1993) [hereinafter
CWc].
79. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpil-
ing of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction,
opened for signature Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163 [hereinafter BTWC].
On the prohibition of biochemical weapons, see Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of
the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Meth-
ods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94 L.N.T.S. 65.
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directly refer to missile firing. The United States, thereupon, en-
couraged the Security Council to adopt a resolution preventing
the development of WMD and their delivery systems.8 0 The Se-
curity Council adopted Resolution 1540 on April 28, 2004 as a
result of these efforts.81
Resolution 1540 was a monumental decision in the fight
against terrorism. It clarified that not only the proliferation of
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, but also their means
of delivery constituted a threat to international peace and secur-
ity.
8 2
Specifically, Resolution 1540 mandated that all States adopt
and enforce effective laws which prohibit any non-State actor to
manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or
use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of
delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes.8" Resolution 1540
also stated that none of the obligations set forth in that Resolu-
tion shall be interpreted so as to conflict with or alter the rights
and obligations of the State Parties to the NPT, the CWC and the
BTWC, or alter the responsibilities of the International Atomic
Energy Agency ("IAEA") or the Organization for the Prohibition
of Chemical Weapons ("OPCW").84
A primary aim that the United States wanted to achieve
through Resolution 1540 was to restrain North Korea's missile
development and export. At that time, North Korea was sus-
pected of supplying missiles to international terrorist groups.
For instance, in 2002, a United States patrolling vessel halted a
North Korean ship on its course to Yemen with fifteen Scud mis-
siles, but had to disengage as international law did not then
grant any authority to stop missile exports.8 5 Now, it is no longer
acceptable within international law for a country to export mis-
80. See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Decides All States Shall
Act to Prevent Proliferation of Mass Destruction Weapons, Resolution 1540 (2004)
Adopted Unanimously, Focuses Attention on Non-State Actors, U.N. Doc. SC/8076
(Apr. 28, 2004).
81. See id.; see also S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 76.
82. See S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 76.
83. See id. 2.
84. See id. 1 5.
85. SeeJames Harding, Mark Huband & Peter Spiegel, U.S. Releases Missiles Ship for
Yemen Missiles Seizure North Korean Weapons Could Have Been in Transit for Onward Passage
to Libya, Syria or Iran, FIN. TIMEs (London), Dec. 11, 2002, at 10.
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siles freely due to Resolution 1540.86 Recently, the PSI, inaugu-
rated by the United States following Resolution 1540, has been
establishing a global network to constrain international terrorist
groups from smuggling WMD and their delivery systems.87 Be-
cause States cooperating with the PSI exercise joint operations
and share information about terrorism and WMD, the PSI is ex-
pected to effectively blockade the missile trade between interna-
tional terrorist groups and terrorism-supporting nations. It is
not clear, however, that such activities under the PSI are allowed
under current international law. There is criticism that the PSI
will infringe upon state sovereignty, which is a fundamental prin-
ciple of modern international law, while it is actively trying to
suppress terrorism.88
2. Customary International Law
The legal characteristics of missile tests can be examined
from a perspective of customary international law. First, custom-
ary international law prohibits a State from the unauthorized use
of the air space above another State.89 Thus, if the North Ko-
rean missiles had entered Japanese air space, there would have
been a definite violation of international law. Since all the mis-
siles wound up in the East Sea of Korea, outside Japanese territo-
rial waters, North Korea may argue that there was no violation of
international law.90 This stance, however, would give rise to a
number of objections.
International law does not prohibit the testing of unarmed
missiles over the oceans, unless ships at sea or other lawful users
of ocean or air space are harmed. By not giving prior notice of
its missile test, however,9 it could be assumed that North Korea
86. S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 76, 9 1.
87. See generally U.S. Department of State, The Proliferation Security Initiative,
http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/proliferation/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2007).
88. See Mark K. Valencia, Japan in a Corner Over Interdictions at Sea, lrrr'L HERALD
TRIB., Oct. 22, 2005, at 6; see also Jofi Joseph, The Proliferation Security Initiative: Can
Interdiction Stop Prolferation?, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, June 2004, http://www.armscon-
trol.org/act/2004_- 06/Joseph.asp.
89. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.CJ. 14, 118 (June
27) (1986); see also I.H.PH. DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, AN INTRODUCTION TO AIR LAw 12-13
(7th rev. ed. 2001).
90. See Frederic L. Kirgis, North Korea's Missile Firings, ASIL INSIGHT, July 24, 2006,
http://www.asil.org/insights/2006/07/insightsO60724.html.
91. Id.; see also S.C. Res. 1695, supra note 39, pmbl.
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violated a procedural norm of international law because it en-
dangered ships and aircraft that might have unknowingly been
in the missiles' path.
Second, North Korea broke the principle of good faith
(pacta sunt servanda) by abolishing the moratorium of 1999 and
the Pyongyang Declaration of 2002 (the "Declaration").92 North
Korea, however, has refuted that because the moratorium and
the Declaration called for merely a suspension, or delay, of mis-
sile discharge, and not permanent termination of its program,
and because those agreements were never formalized, it is not
legally bound by the statements it may have made.9 3 Neverthe-
less, some similar declarations have been treated as binding
under international law. In the French Nuclear Tests Cases of 1974,
the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") treated as binding a
unilateral public declaration by the French government that no
further nuclear tests would be held in the atmosphere in the
South Pacific.94 The Court noted that unilateral acts can create
legal obligations.95 Even if North Korea's missile test did not di-
rectly violate concrete regulations of international law, it could
be considered a grave threat to international peace and security.
At that point, North Korea's stance is contrary to fundamental
norms of the international community.96
3. The Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation
It has also been claimed that North Korea's missile dis-
charge violated the Chicago Convention on International Civil
Aviation of 1944 ("Civil Aviation Convention"). 97 Reviewing
safety regulations including Article 3(d)98  and Article
92. See Security Council Condemns, supra note 18; see also Pyongyang Declaration,
Japan-N. Korea, Sept. 17, 2002, available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n-
korea/pmv0209/pyongyang.html. See generally supra note 15 and accompanying text.
93. See Kirgis, supra note 90.
94. See Nuclear Tests Case (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 261, 270 (Dec. 20); Nu-
clear Tests Case (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 457 (Dec. 20).
95. See Nuclear Tests Case (Austl. v. Fr.) 1974 I.C.J. 253, 270, 271 (Dec. 20).
96. See Kirgis, supra note 90; see also U.N. Charter arts. 39-51.
97. Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15
U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter Civil Aviation Convention]; see ChoJoon-hyung, North Korea's
Missile Firing: Violation of International Law?, YoN-tr NEWS (S. Korea), July 15, 2006,
http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/cgi-bin/naver (available only in Korean).
98. "The contracting States undertake, when issuing regulations for their state air-
craft, that they will have due regard for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft." Civil
Aviation Convention, supra note 97, art. 3(d).
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44(d)&(h)99 of the Civil Aviation Convention, these regulations
are general standards for safe air navigation of civil aircraft and
are not suitable to apply to the rules of the nonproliferation of
WMD and their delivery systems, such as missiles. Relevant con-
ditions regarding the missile firing, including the orbit and the
point of impact, should be scrutinized in order to examine the
legality of North Korea's missile discharge.
a. Will the Terminology Used in Resolution 1695 Create
Binding Force Over North Korea?
Japan first presented the draft of Resolution 1695 on July 6,
2006, and after conciliating with the draft that China and Russia
submitted, it was finally passed on July 15.100 Japan's original
draft was considerably different from China's, especially con-
cerning the level of sanctions against North Korea. 1° 1 The dif-
ferences are vividly illustrated by the terminology used in their
drafts. First, with respect to Chapter VII of the Charter, Japan
tried to explicitly include Chapter VII in the draft, while China
omitted it.10 2 This was the biggest controversy in the course of
adopting Resolution 1695. The final draft did not explicitly re-
fer to Chapter VII, but it stated that the Security Council acts
"under its special responsibility for the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security." Second, regarding the moratorium
on missile launching, Japan tried to use the term "decides" in
order to re-establish the pre-existing commitments to the mora-
torium, while China preferred the term "calls on." The parties
chose "demands" after conciliation.' 3 Third, on the prohibition
of transferring missile and missile-related items, materials, goods
and technology to North Korea, Japan insisted on the term "de-
99. "The aims and objectives of the Organization are to develop the principles and
techniques of international air navigation and to foster the planning and development
of international air transport so as to: (d) Meet the needs of the peoples of the world
for safe, regular, efficient and economical air transport; (h) Promote safety of flight in
international air navigation." Id. art. 44(d), (h).
100. See Edith M. Lederer, U.N. Imposes Limited Sanctions on N. Korea, WASH. POST,
July 15, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/15/
AR2006071500538.html; Security Council Condemns, supra note 18
101. See Lederer, supra note 100.
102. See e.g., John R. Crook, ed., Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law: Use of Force and Arms Control: United States Supports UN Sanctions, Vigor-
ous Enforcement Following North Korean Missile and Nuclear Tests, 101 Am. J. IN"r'L. L. 216
(2007); Hoge, supra note 20.
103. See Crook, supra note 102; Hoge, supra note 20.
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cides," while China continued to propose "calls on." The Secur-
ity Council chose the term, "requires" in the final resolution.
Fourth, with regard to the prohibition of the procurement of
missiles or missile related-items, materials, goods and technology
from North Korea, and the transfer of any financial resources in
relation to North Korea's missile or WMD programs, Japan once
again insisted on the term "decides," while China again pro-
posed "calls on." Usage of the term "requires" resolved the con-
flict. Lastly, Japan urged North Korea to discontinue all nuclear
weapon-related activities and return immediately to the Six-Party
Talks, while China called on North Korea to return to NPT and
IAEA Safeguards. The final draft contained both proposi-
tions. 1 0
4
As shown in Table 11-1, the final draft is closer to China's
position than Japan's. It is noticeable that Resolution 1695 does
not use the term "decides" in its main statements, while it is re-
ferred to in most of the previous Security Council resolutions
related to major crises threatening international peace and se-
curity. Therefore, the terminology laid down in Resolution
1695, such as "demands," "requires," and "urges," must be ex-
amined to ascertain whether they have any legally binding force
rather than just a psychological impact or normative coercive-
ness. In Security Council resolutions, the term "decides," gener-
ally implies a compelling force. Thus, if a targeted country does
not comply with a clause containing the term "decides," compul-
sive measures will be taken. On the contrary, the terms "de-
mands," "requires" and "urges" give a sense of strong recommen-
dation rather than a mandate. In this case, measures of force
can hardly be called upon. Most of the previous Security Coun-
cil resolutions with compelling measures contained terminolo-
gies such as "decides" or "authorizes." An example is Resolution
1333, adopted on December 19, 2000, which included coercive
statements against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.1o 5 In Res-
olution 1333, the term "decides" was stipulated a total of ten
times among the twenty-six declared statements. 10 6 Resolution
1718 is also a similar case. Because the Security Council had the
clear intention to condemn North Korea's nuclear test, "de-
104. See S.C. Res. 1695, supra note 39.
105. S.C. Res. 1333, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1333 (Dec. 19, 2000).
106. Id. 1 5, 6, 8, 10-12, 22-24, 26.
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TABLE H-1: COMPARISON BETWEEN THE DRAFTS OF
RESOLUTION 1695
Content Japan's draft China's draft Final draft
Chapter VII of Included Not Included Not included:
U.N. Charter The Security
Council acts
under its special
responsibility for
the maintenance
of international
peace and securi-
ty
The re-establish- Decides Calls on Demands
ment of morato-
rium of North
Korea missile
launching
The prohibition Decides Calls on Requires
on export of mis-
siles and related
material to North
Korea
The prohibition Decides Calls on Requires
on the procure-
ment of North
Korea's missiles
and transfer of
technology
The reference to Demands: Calls on: Adopted both
North Korea's Discontinuation Return to NPT proposions:
nuclear weapon of every nuclear and IAEA Safe- Return to Six
related activities weapon related guards Party Talks with-
activity- out any precondi-
Immediately re- tion-
turn to Six Party Urged coopera-
talks. tion with NPT
and IAEA safe-
guards
Enforcement of Enforced duty of Recommendation Dissension about
the Resolution U.N member without compul- enforcement
states sion
cides" was referred to eight times among the seventeen main
statements in the resolution.1"7 Considering the aforemen-
tioned cases, the fact that the Security Council passed Resolution
107. S.C. Res. 1718, supra note 61, 5-10, 12.
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1695 with terms such as "demands," "requires" and "urges," in-
stead of Japan's preference, "decides," demonstrates the Coun-
cil's hesitation to enforce the resolution against North Korea.
Therefore, considering the terminologies used in the resolution
text, Resolution 1695 does not create substantial binding force
towards North Korea.
B. Can The U.N. Member States Stop North Korea's Missile Launch
In Accordance With Their National Legal Authorities
And Legislation?
The third and fourth clauses of Resolution 1695 contain the
phrase, "in accordance with their national legal authorities and
legislation . "..."108 Whether the U.N. Member States can sanc-
tion North Korea's missile test-fire by their national laws is, thus,
another issue that has to be addressed in an examination of Res-
olution 1695. It is traditionally recognized that national law is
considered a mere fact before an international tribunal. 0 9 Arti-
cle 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969
states: "A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law
as justification for its failure to perform a treaty." ° Article
38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice does
not refer to domestic law as a source of international law ei-
ther.11 From this perspective, Resolution 1695 contradicts the
general principle of international law, given that it presents do-
mestic law as a call to action for the international community.
Paradoxically, the fact that the Security Council Resolution men-
tioned national legal authorities and legislation as a ground for
sanctions against North Korea signifies that there is no general
international law that can effectively control North Korea's mis-
sile launches and exports, except for a few statements in Resolu-
108. S.C. Res. 1695, supra note 39, 3-4.
109. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 38-40 (4th ed.
1990). In the case of Certain German Interest in Polish Upper Silesia, the Permanent Court
of International Justice observed: "From the standpoint of International Law ... mu-
nicipal laws are merely facts which express the will and constitute the activities of States
.... " See Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia(Ger. v. Pol.), 1926 P.C.I.J.
(ser. A) No. 7, at 19 (May 25).
110. See The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 27, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331; see also ANTHONY AusT, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 144 (2000);
IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CoNVEN-rioN ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 84 (1984).
111. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1),June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993.
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tion 1540 and the PSI. Considering contemporary world polit-
ics, it is highly questionable whether any U.N. Member States
can restrain the missile firing or exports of the biggest military
powers, such as the United States or Russia, by their domestic
laws. One-sided sanctions would infringe upon the principle of
mutuality in international law. Overcoming this discrepancy
may be the key to restraining the proliferation of WMD.
C. Does International Law Prohibit a Sovereign State from
Possessing Nuclear Weapons?
In Resolution 1718, the Security Council, condemning the
nuclear test, urges North Korea to abandon all existing WMD
and ballistic missile programs "in a complete, verifiable and irre-
versible manner."' 12 A question may arise whether a sovereign
state ever has the right to possess nuclear weapons.
North Korea's obligation to abide by Resolution 1718 may
stem from two bases. The first includes international treaties of
nuclear disarmament including the NPT. The NPT, however,
has been criticized for creating a double standard. Although
some nuclear states such as India, Pakistan, and Israel, as well as
the nuclear superpowers, remain outside the NPT system, they
are not at a disadvantage in any category of the international
community. Unfortunately, the numbers of existing nuclear
weapons of the nuclear powers are not decreasing significantly,
in spite of a series of nuclear test bans and limitations of strategic
arms treaties concluded since the Cold War era. As long as the
nuclear superpowers do not substantially eliminate their nuclear
weapons caches, international law cannot effectively control
renegades of the NPT system like North Korea. Therefore, the
best way of restricting the development of nuclear weapons is to
change the current two-tier system underlying the international
law of nuclear weapons control.
The second ground is the joint statement from the Six-Party
Talks released on September 19, 2005.113 The statement pro-
vides: "The DPRK committed to abandoning all nuclear weap-
ons and existing nuclear programs.""' 4 Is a unilateral declara-
112. S.C. Res. 1718, supra note 61, 7.
113. Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks, Sept. 19, 2005,
available at http://www.pircenter.org/data/resources/JointStatl90905.pdf.
A14. Id.
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tion like the joint statement binding on North Korea? As men-
tioned above, the ICJ in the French Nuclear Tests Cases adjudicated
that under certain circumstances, a state's unilateral declaration
could establish an international legal obligation to abide by the
terms of the declaration.115 The Court emphasized the impor-
tance of the intentions of the State making the declaration. Ac-
cording to the Court, the two prerequisites for the creation of a
binding international obligation are that the declaration: (1) be
given publicly; and (2) be made with the intention of being
bound thereby."' 6
Analyzing the joint statement, however, it is recognized that
North Korea made it neither as a public statement, nor in such a
way as to indicate an intention to be bound regardless of the
action of other states 17  This declaration was made in the
course of negotiations in which North Korea was expected to
give up its nuclear weapons programs in exchange for recogni-
tion, an end to international isolation, and accompanying bene-
fits to be provided by the Six-Party Talks.11 Thus, it is difficult to
argue that this commitment unconditionally constitutes a legal
obligation of North Korea. Unfortunately, neither codified rules
nor customary international law has indicated evident grounds
to completely prohibit sovereign States from possessing nuclear
weapons. A global commitment is needed for a multilateral
treaty universally outlawing nuclear weapons.
115. See Nuclear Tests Case (Austi. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253 (Dec. 20); Nuclear Tests
Case (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 457 (Dec. 20); see also ChristopherJ. Le Mon, International
Law and North Korean Nuclear Testing, ASIL INSIGHT, Oct. 19, 2006, http://www.asil.org/
insights/2006/10/insights06102O.html.
116. See Nuclear Tests Case (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 457, 472 (Dec. 20) ("It is well
recognized that declarations made by way of unilateral acts . . . may have the effect of
creating legal obligations .... When it is the intention of the State making the declara-
tion that it should become bound according to its terms, that intention confers on the
declaration the character of a legal undertaking, the State being thenceforth legally
required to follow a course of conduct consistent with the declaration. An undertaking
of this kind, if given publicly, and with the intent to be bound... is binding."); see also
Le Mon, supra note 115.
117. See Nuclear Tests Case (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 457, 472-73 (Dec. 20) ("[T]he
intention of being bound-the intention is to be ascertained by interpretation of the
act. When States make statements by which their freedom of action is to be limited, a
restrictive interpretation is called for.").
118. See Le Mon, supra note 115.
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III. THE TWO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS AND
CHAPTER VII OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER
A. The Security Council Resolutions and
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter
Resolutions 1695 and 1718 condemned North Korea's mis-
sile and nuclear tests. They declared that such incidents should
be prohibited mainly because such actions are threats to global
peace. Through its resolutions, the Security Council imposes a
certain degree of obligation by which U.N. Member States must
abide. When a targeted country intentionally fails to comply
with the obligations of a resolution, the Council may execute co-
ercive measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security. A primary legal basis of these coercive measures is
Chapter VII of the Charter. Chapter VII (Articles 39-51) sets out
the Security Council's powers to maintain peace and security." 9
It allows the Council to "determine the existence of any threat to
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" and to take
military and nonmilitary action to "restore international peace
and security."120 Chapter VII is the most controversial part of
the Charter, since some provisions in it used to be inconsistent
with the basic principle of the Charter, such as comprehensive
prohibition of the use of force provided by Article 2(4).21 Nev-
ertheless, Chapter VII gives the Security Council the legitimate
power to assure collective security and to attain peace and secur-
ity within the international community, which is what the United
Nations aims for.
The current collective security system has been re-modeled
in order to prevent the repetition of mistakes that had been
made by the League of Nations (the "League"). 22 Rules set by
119. U.N. Charter arts. 39-51; see PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRO-
DUCTiON TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 387-90 (7th rev. ed. 1997).
120. U.N. Charter arts. 3942; see MALANCZUK, supra note 119, at 388; see also
DANESH SAROOSHI, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF COLLECTIVE SECUR-
rrv 3 (1999).
121. "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." U.N. Charter
art. 2, para. 4.
122. See Jost Delbrack, Collective Security, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw 104, 108-109 (Rudolph Bernhardt ed., 1982) (discussing the collective se-
curity system of the League of Nations); Jochen Abr. Frowein, Article 41, in THE CHAR-
TER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 623-24 (Bruno Simma ed., 1994).
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the Covenant of the League indicated that any war or threat of
war was declared a matter of concern to the entire League and
the League should take any action to safeguard the peace of na-
tions. 1 2  In particular, military action should be imposed on
Member States that directly resort to war. Article 16 of the Cove-
nant provides:
Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard
of its covenants under Articles 12, 13 or 15, it shall ipso facto
be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other
Members of the League .... It shall be the duty of the Coun-
cil in such case to recommend to the several Governments
concerned what effective military, naval or air force the Mem-
bers of the League shall severally contribute to the armed
forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League. 124
While the collective security policy of the League seemed
well developed in the Covenant, it proved to be weak in practice
because Article 16 provided for only a partial prohibition of war,
which hampered the effective functioning of the League. More-
over, the League's collective security system proved to be imprac-
ticable because of its lack of a central decision-making proce-
dure for applying sanctions and deciding whether or not an act
of aggression had occurred. Additionally, since individual Mem-
ber States were to decide for themselves the extent that they par-
ticipated in economic, financial, and other measures taken
against an aggressor nation, it was unlikely that any act of aggres-
sion could be met by a coordinated, collective response.
125
The lessons to be drawn from the League's experience are
as follows. First, this experience taught the international com-
munity that without a centralized authoritative determination as
to whether an act of aggression has occurred and how to re-
spond to that action, the concept of a collective security policy
may not be effective. Second, it is necessary to completely out-
law the use of force, except for the purpose of self-defense, so
that no state may legally assume an aggressive policy. Lastly, the
introduction of operational machinery for the peaceful settle-
ment of disputes is of primary importance. Keeping these find-
ings in mind, the founders of the U.N. drew up a new collective
123. League of Nations Covenant art. 11.
124. Id. art. 16.
125. See Delbrfick, supra note 122, at 108-09.
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security system in the Charter.126
The collective security measures of the United Nations are
discharged in four different stages. 1 27 First, the Security Council
independently determines the existence of "any threat to the
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, and shall make
recommendations... to maintain or restore international peace
and security."'121 Second, "[i]n order to prevent an aggravation
of the situation, the Security Council may ... call upon the par-
ties concerned to comply with provisional measures," such as the
withdrawal of armed forces. 129 Third, using measures "not in-
volving the use of armed force," the Council may call upon
Member States to institute "complete or partial interruption of
economic relations, ...communication, and the severance of
diplomatic relations." 3 ' Fourth, the Security Council "may take
[military] action by air, sea, or land forces .. .to maintain or
restore international peace and security."' 1 The scope of such
measures depends on the magnitude and nature of the crisis. As
for substantive decisions, they are made by an affirmative vote of
nine members of the Council, including the concurring votes of
the five permanent members. 132 Once decided, the measure is
legally binding on all Member States and the Council relies
upon Member States to perform their parts in the implementa-
tion of U.N. objectives.' 33
B. Resolution 1695 Without Chapter VII Of The Charter
Generally, a Security Council resolution may authorize the
imposition of sanctions against a targeted party through Chapter
VII, providing substantive grounds for performing the duty of
preserving collective security. The inclusion of Chapter VII of
the Charter in the text of Resolution 1695 was naturally the most
126. See id. at 108-09.
127. See id. at 109-11 (detailing the collective security measures of the United Na-
tions).
128. U.N. Charter art. 39.
129. Id. art. 40.
130. Id. art. 41; see CHRISTINA GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE
154-58 (2000) (critical interpretation of Article 41).
131. U.N. Charter art. 42.
132. Id. art. 27, para. 3; see also SYDNEY D. BAILEY & SAM DAWS, THE PROCEDURE OF
THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL 226-27 (3d ed. 1998) (detailing Article 27).
133. See Frowein, supra note 122, at 626-27.
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controversial issue in the drafting process."i 4 Resolution 1695
was eventually passed without explicitly referring to Chapter VII.
Undoubtedly, the Council could have carried out strong mea-
sures against North Korea if Chapter VII was mentioned in the
resolution. Because Chapter VII is not mentioned, however,
there emerged a dispute between the United States and Japan,
on one side, and China and Russia, over whether the Council
can enforce collective security measures toward North Korea
under the current resolution. What if North Korea does not
comply with the requirements of the resolution and launches an-
other missile? Would it be possible, in this case, for the Council
to take non-military or military measures solely through Resolu-
tion 1695? On these questions, the two sides maintained oppos-
ing views. John Bolton, the United States' permanent represen-
tative to the U.N., asserted that it is mandatory that all Security
Council resolutions be followed, regardless of whether the lan-
guage includes a reference to Chapter VII.135 He also claimed
that the phrase, "acting under special responsibility for the main-
tenance of international peace and security," in Resolution 1695
made possible an interpretation that the Resolution indirectly
refers to Chapter VII. 1 3 6 Japan agreed with the United States,
insisting that Resolution 1695 had definite legally binding force,
even if Chapter VII was not explicitly mentioned.137 On the con-
trary, China and Russia emphasized that Chapter VII was not re-
ferred to in the resolution text, and therefore it does not author-
ize economic and military sanctions against North Korea. Wang
Guangya, China's permanent representative to the United Na-
tions, opposed taking coercive measures under Chapter VII be-
cause it might only serve to aggravate and complicate the situa-
tion."'8 Vitaly Churkin, Russia's permanent representative, also
regarded Resolution 1695 as an appropriate warning rather than
134. See Warren Hoge, UN. Council, in Weakened Resolution, Demands End to North
Korean Missile Program, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2006, at 8.
135. See id.; Lee Ki-chang, A Dispute on Whether the Security Council Resolution Carries
Legally Binding Force, YoNHAJ' NEWS (S. Korea), July 16, 2006, http://www.
yonhapnews.co.kr (available only in Korean).
136. See Lee, supra note 135.
137. See id.
138. See U.N. Demands End to N. Korea Missile Program, Pyongyang Says No, TURKISH
PRESS, July 15, 2006, available at http://www.turkishpress.com/news.asp?id=1 33780; Se-
curity Council Condemns, supra note 18.
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a commitment with a strong legal effect. 3 ' He maintained that
the resolution only urged North Korea to observe the morato-
rium of missile launching and to return to the Six-Party Talks.
140
Regarding the legal obligations that Resolution 1695 would
impose upon North Korea and other U.N. Member States, China
and Russia share the same position. They recognize that Resolu-
tion 1695, without Chapter VII, does not institute compulsory
measures, but implies that the United Nations simply "de-
mands," "requires," and "urges" North Korea to reinstitute the
moratorium on missile launching.14" ' On the other hand, the
United States and Japan agree that Resolution 1695 should have
undeniable legally binding force, allowing the Security Council
to take all available measures, including the recommendation of
military action, by this resolution. 142
Although Chapter VII is not explicitly referred to within its
text, Resolution 1695 is basically in accordance with the spirits of
Chapter VII in so far as it is a decision of the Security Council for
the maintenance of international peace and security. None-
theless, the very action of passing the bill without sufficient au-
thoritative terms like "decides" shows that the legal effect of the
resolution is limited. Hence, it is difficult to take non-military or
military action directly, as Chapter VII can allow, through Reso-
lution 1695.
Chapter VII provides the most coercive measures available
in the U.N. Charter. The Security Council carries out its primary
role, maintaining international peace and security, through
those provisions. Due to the serious repercussions that compul-
sory action would create, however, military measures provided
for in Article 42 of Chapter VII have rarely been called for in
controversial international disputes. During the Korean War,
143
139. See Security Council Condemns, supra note 18.
140. See Lee, supra note 135.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. The Soviet Union insisted that resolutions were "null and void," violating Art.
27, para. 3 of the Charter, which requires the affirmative votes of all permanent mem-
bers. Leo Gross maintains that the wording of Art. 27, para. 3 is unambiguous and
mere practice in the Security Council cannot alter the strict requirement of the Char-
ter's words. See Leo Gross, Voting in the Security Council: Abstention From Voting and Absence
From Meetings, 60 YALE LJ. 209, 247-51 (1951). On the other hand, Myres S. McDougal
and Richard N. Gardner claim that it should not be denied that the users of the U.N.
Charter are confronted with the necessity of interpreting it through the perspective of
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for example, the Security Council had to gradually escalate the
level of compulsory measures it demanded regarding North Ko-
rea's aggressions; first it called for the immediate cessation of
hostilities,"' and later recommended military action.' 4 5 Moreo-
ver, calls for military action have often been defeated in the past
by a veto from one of the five permanent members of the Secur-
ity Council.14 6 Taking this into account, the compulsory mea-
sures in Resolution 1695 do not seem to demand military action
as provided by Article 42 of the Charter. If North Korea were to
resume missile discharge, however, the Council must upgrade
the resolution with a reference to Chapter VII, so as to constrain
North Korea with stronger authority.
C. Resolution 1718 Under Article 41 Of The Charter
Unlike Resolution 1695, which did not explicitly refer to
Chapter VII, Resolution 1718 stipulates that the Security Council
is "[a] cting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Na-
tions, and taking measures under its Article 41."147 Article 41 of
the Charter authorizes the Council to employ measures that do
not involve the use of armed forces to give effect to its objec-
tives. 148  Pursuant to Article 41, the U.N. Member States can
today. See Myres S. McDougal & Richard N. Gardner, The Veto and The Charter: An Inter-
pretation for Survival, 60 YALE L.J. 258, 264-65 (1951); see also L.B. Sohn, Modernizing the
Structure and Procedure of the Security Council, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ROLE OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL: PEACE-KEEPING AND PEACE-BUILDING 385-97 (R-J. Dupuy, ed.,
1993) (describing the procedure of the Security Council); HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF
THE UNITED NATIONS, A CRrrICAL ANALYSIS OF ITS FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS 927-49 (The
Lawbook Exchange photo. reprint 2001) (1950) (detailing collective security action dur-
ing the Korean War).
144. On June 25, 1950, when North Korea attacked South Korea, the Security
Council immediately denounced North Korea's action as a breach of peace by Resolu-
tion 82, and called upon North Korea to stop hostility and retreat back to the 38th
parallel. See S.C. Res. 82, U.N. Doc. S/RES/82 (June 25, 1950).
145. On June 27, 1950, the Security Council recommended that Member States
repel North Korea's attack and devise measures to maintain peace and security on the
Korean peninsula. On July 7, the United Nation delegated the unified command in the
United States of America in order to devise the compulsory measure. See S.C. Res. 84,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/84 (July 7, 1950); S.C. Res. 83, U.N. Doc. S/RES/83 (June 27, 1950);
see also DJ. HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAw 882-86 (4th ed. 1991);
CHUNG IN-SEoP, KoREAN QUESTIONS IN THE UNITED NATIONS 251-58 (2002); You TAE-
WOO, THE KOREAN WAR AND THE UNITED NATIONS (1964) (describing the role of the
United Nations in the Korean War).
146. See Gross, supra note 143, 227-39.
147. S.C. Res. 1718, supra note 61, pmbl.
148. See Frowein, supra note 122, 621-28.
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sanction North Korea by "complete or partial interruption of ec-
onomic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio
and other means of communication, and the severance of diplo-
matic relations."149 Also, the resolution prohibits providing
North Korea with large-scale arms, technology related to ballistic
missiles or WMD, and certain luxury goods. Resolution 1718
also prohibits North Korea from exporting ballistic missiles or
WMD technology. To implement these sanctions under Article
41, the Council prohibited all U.N. Member States from directly
or indirectly supplying North Korea with certain armaments, as
well as any items or technical assistance that could significantly
enhance North Korea's nuclear, ballistic missile or other WMD
programs.1"'
Together with the general coercive measures taken under
Article 41, Resolution 1718 calls upon Member States to inspect
cargo shipped to and from North Korea, as necessary, in order
to ensure compliance with the sanctions. 5 ' This is the first time
that the Security Council has actively encouraged participation
in cooperative inspection initiatives in a concrete case.1 5 2 This
clause seems to justify the boarding of foreign vessels on the
high seas to inspect for contraband, without prior consent of the
flag state. This is a controversial proposition. While the United
States sought authorization for cargo inspections, China an-
nounced that it had reservations about the provision. 51
Resolution 1718 may conflict with "the freedom of the high
seas " 15 4 principle, given that it arguably permits inspection of
cargo without prior consent of the flag state. The "freedom of
the high seas" principle has been firmly established by customary
international law and codified in the U.N. Convention on the
Law of the Sea ("UNCLOS"). 55 UNCLOS provides that the
high seas are open to all states and shall be reserved for peaceful
149. See U.N. Charter art. 41.
150. See S.C. Res. 1718, supra note 61, 8; Le Mon, supra note 115.
151. S.C. Res. 1718, supra note 61, 8(f); see Le Mon, supra note 115.
152. See Andreas L. Paulus & J6rn Miler, Security Council Resolution 1718 on North
Korea's Nuclear Test, ASIL Insight, Nov. 3, 2006, http://www.asil.org/insights/2006/11/
insights061103.html; see also U.N. SCOR, 61st Sess., 5551st mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc. S/
PV.5551 (Oct. 14, 2006) [hereinafter Oct. 14 Meeting].
153. See Oct. 14 Meeting, supra note 152, at 4; Paulus, supra note 152.
154. See R.R. CHURCHILL & A.V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 205-08 (3d ed. 1999).
155. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397.
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purposes.156 Every State has the right to sail ships flying its flag
on the high seas.11 7 Only the flag State can exercise control over
their ships. 58 Even warships have complete immunity from the
jurisdiction of any state other than the flag state on the high
seas. 1 59 Piracy is an exception from the immunity principle.
When a ship is considered to be committing piracy, other states
can capture that ship, arrest persons and seize the property on
board. 6 ° In addition to piracy, another exemption is that a war-
ship can stop a foreign ship and board to inspect cargo on the
high seas if there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the
ship is engaged in the slave trade, unauthorized broadcasting,
without nationality, flying a foreign flag, or refusing to show its
flag.161 Even in those cases, a state making a seizure without ade-
quate grounds, and causing any loss or damage, is liable to the
flag state. 1 6 2 As long as a North Korean ship is not committing
one of the actions mentioned above, the inspection of cargo to
and from North Korea may not be harmonized with the "free-
dom of the high seas," which is an accepted principle of interna-
tional law. Reviewing the regulations of UNCLOS, thus, the in-
spection under Resolution 1718 should not be permitted univer-
sally, but in a limited time, space and situation as a sanction of
the Security Council against North Korea's WMD development.
Reasonable grounds for inspection are prerequisite even in that
case.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, the author has tried to analyze the legal dis-
putes arising from the recently adopted Security Council resolu-
tions against North Korea's WMD development. Between July
and October of 2006, North Korea conducted missile and nu-
clear tests that had serious impacts on the global community.
The missile firing on July 5, 2006 indicated the end of the mora-
torium on missile launching that had been set up between the
United States and North Korea in 1999. The nuclear test is no
156. Id. arts. 87-88.
157. Id. art. 90.
158. Id. art. 94, 1.
159. Id. art. 95.
160. Id. art. 105.
161. Id. art. 110; see CHURCHILL, supra note 154, at 209-14.
162. Id. art. 106.
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less serious because it signified the failure of painstaking efforts
to sustain a non-nuclear Korean peninsula.
Resolutions 1695 and 1718 contain many critical legal ques-
tions. Part I arranged the factual bases for these legal questions.
It also reviewed the drafting process of the resolutions.
Part II dealt with legal questions concerning the two resolu-
tions. The first question concerns the international legal charac-
teristics of the missile launch. In order to effectively sanction
North Korea, it is important to figure out whether the missile
discharge was an illegal act, based on international law. Unlike
nuclear or biochemical weapons, which are lethal objects of
mass destruction, a missile is nothing more than a delivery sys-
tem of WMD, and can be used as a non-violent device, such as an
artificial satellite. The missile discharge had not been effectively
regulated by international law before the Security Council's Res-
olution 1540 was passed in April 2004. At that time, missile dis-
charge was outside international law because it was regarded as a
sovereign right of self-defense. Resolution 1540 finally outlawed
the missile discharge, prohibiting all States from providing non-
State actors with any materials or technology to develop WMD
and their delivery systems. Yet, Resolution 1540 is limited to
prohibiting missile discharge only when used in terrorism, or in
support of those foregoing activities. Hence, it must be proved
whether North Korea's missiles are supporting terrorism. If not,
North Korea's missile firing could be legitimate according to Ar-
ticle 2(7)163 or Article 51164 of the U.N. Charter. Resolution
1540 is also a monumental decision to fight against terrorism
163. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Na-
tions to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdic-
tion of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settle-
ment under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the
application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7.
164. Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individ-
ual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the
exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Se-
curity Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility
of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such
action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international
peace and security.
U.N. Charter art. 51.
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because it complements the PSI. The PSI, a developing global
initiative to prevent international terrorist groups from smug-
gling WMD and their delivery systems, is quite controversial be-
cause it arguably contradicts basic principles of modern interna-
tional law, including state sovereignty and the "freedom of the
high seas." Just a few statements in Resolution 1540 would not
override the general practices and norms of international law
which have been maintained for centuries. More serious consid-
erations should be given to the conditions that allow cargo in-
spection without prior consent of the flag state.
Part II also examined North Korea's missile test from the
perspective of customary international law. First, North Korea
failed to give prior notice of its missile test and endangered ships
or aircraft that might have been in the missiles' path. This
would be a violation of procedural norms of international law.
Second, in a broad sense, North Korea infringed the territorial
integrity of other nations. Customary international law prohibits
a State from the unauthorized use of air space for territorial in-
tegrity. Although the North Korean missiles did not trespassJap-
anese airspace directly, it would be considered a threat to the
peace and security of other nations. As such, the missile dis-
charge could be an indirect encroachment of territorial integrity
and security. Third, North Korea violated the principle of good
faith. There are two accords that North Korea made for the sus-
pension of missile development; one is the moratorium of mis-
sile launching with the United States, and the other, the Pyongy-
ang Declaration, with Japan. The missile test-fire abolished
these accords. North Korea refuted that those agreements were
not treaties but unilateral declarations. In the French Nuclear Test
Cases, however, the ICJ adjudicated that a unilateral declaration
could be regarded as binding if other states might rely on such a
declaration. According to the Court, the binding declaration
should be given publicly and made with the intention of being
bound thereby. It is not clear, however, whether the morato-
rium or the Pyongyang Declaration would meet all of those con-
ditions.
The second question concerning the resolutions is related
to the significance of the terminologies invoked in Resolution
1695. It has been analyzed and compared to previous resolu-
tions that carried binding force. To begin with, Japan insisted
on the term "decides," meaning compelling power, while China
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proposed terms like "urges," "demands" or "calls upon," imply-
ing normative coerciveness. The final draft is more similar to
China's proposal than Japan's. The United States and Japan
might have relented in order to pass the resolution unani-
mously. Analyzing previous Security Council resolutions, state-
ments with the term "decides" had a strong compulsory mean-
ing. Thus, compulsory acts would be required when the
targeted nation did not fulfill certain obligations.
The third question involves the implications of national le-
gal authorities and legislation in relation to Resolution 1695.
Generally, domestic law is considered a mere fact before an in-
ternational court. It is, thus, disputable whether national law
could be a call to action of a member of the international com-
munity. National law may not be a direct source of international
law. Neither Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, nor Article 38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ, lays down
national law as a source of international rules.
The fourth question concerns a nation's right to possess nu-
clear weapons. Neither positive rules nor customary interna-
tional law have universally prohibited a state from possessing nu-
clear weapons. The NPT and other international treaties con-
cerning nuclear disarmament do not contain clear grounds to
comprehensively ban nuclear weapons of every nation. Unless
nuclear weapons are banned universally, it is impossible to com-
pletely halt the nuclear weapons development process through
contemporary international law. The best way to suspend nu-
clear weapon development in North Korea will be to overcome
the double standard inherent in the NPT. Maybe in the future,
when all nations including current nuclear superpowers are the
members of a multilateral treaty totally banning nuclear weap-
ons, it will be possible for mankind to convince renegades, like
North Korea, not to go nuclear.
Part III examined the legally binding force of the two reso-
lutions. The Security Council adopted Resolution 1695 without
referring to Chapter VII of the Charter. A question may arise as
to whether the Council could enforce collective security mea-
sures toward North Korea directly from Resolution 1695. It is
clear that the resolution is based on Chapter VII of the Charter,
regardless of whether Chapter VII is omitted or not. Neverthe-
less, without a clear reference to Chapter VII, there are still un-
certainties as to how severe the legally binding force can be. Res-
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olution 1695 is closer to the "provisional measure" which recom-
mends other Member States control North Korea's access to
missile-related items, goods, materials, technology, and financial
resources. However, military measures should not be taken
based directly on the resolution. Military action is the last means
to which the Security Council may resort. Once the Council
takes military action, there are no measures remaining when it
has to face circumstances graver than just a missile test. If mili-
tary action is sanctioned, North Korea may consider more con-
frontational plans for justifying their actions based on the "right
of self defense," laid down in Article 51 of the Charter. Cur-
rently, international law has not completely forbidden missile
discharge. To effectively sanction North Korea's missile test, the
Security Council should seriously consider the conditions from a
legal and diplomatic point of view.
Finally, Resolution 1718 stipulates that the Security Council
will be taking measures under Article 41 of the Charter. Article
41 authorizes the Council to take measures not involving the use
of armed forces to give effect to its decisions. According to Arti-
cle 41, the U.N. Member States can sanction North Korea by
complete or partial interruption of economic and diplomatic re-
lations, and other means of communication. Resolution 1718
authorized the inspection of cargo being shipped to and from
North Korea, in order to ensure compliance with the sanctions.
This clause is against the "freedom of the high seas" principle.
However, the cargo inspection without the prior consent of the
flag state will be legitimate if a North Korean ship is suspected of
committing one of the illegal acts laid down in Article 110 of
UNCLOS. Cargo inspection on the high seas should be allowed
only when there is no option but to immediately stop the ship
and inspect the cargo on board because negligence might result
in a most serious threat to international peace and security.
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